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Inequality in Incomes and Access to
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Daniele Checchi
Abstract. In the current debate on the relationship between inequality in income
distribution and growth, one of the possible links works through access to educa-
tion. Starting from an optimal demand for education where, among other things,
the years of education depend on family income, we derive two testable predic-
tions in the analysis of aggregate data on school enrolments: a negative (linear)
dependence of enrolment rates on the Gini concentration index on income distri-
bution; and a positive dependence on public resources invested in education and/or
on skill premium in the labour market. These predictions are tested on a (un-
balanced) panel of 108 countries for the period 1960–95. The main finding of this
analysis is that, once we control for the degree of development with the (log of)
per capita output, financial constraints seem mainly relevant in limiting the access
to secondary education. However, when considering gender differences, there is
evidence that female participation in education is more conditioned by family
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wealth, in some cases starting from primary education. Finally, there is weak 
evidence that public resources spent on education raise the enrolment rates.
1. Introduction
In recent years there has been a revival of interest in studying 
the relationship between inequality and growth. After the works 
by Kuznets in the 1950s (e.g. Kuznets, 1955), where the stages of
growth were shaping the degree of inequality in society, the issue
was neglected for almost 30 years, to reappear again at the begin-
ning of the current decade. Starting with the empirical finding of a
negative relationship between income inequality and growth of per
capita income observed in different samples of countries in the last
30 years, several studies have proposed alternative explanations.
Without any claim to completeness, one could group existing expla-
nations into two main lines of research.1 The first one invokes po-
litical economy actions, in a context of asset market completeness.
Greater inequality raises the demand for fiscal redistribution and
introduces distortions that hamper private investment decisions.2
An empirical variant of the same idea is that (wealth) inequality
makes turmoil more likely (e.g. the lack of land reform), increases
political instability, makes investors’ horizons shakier and eventu-
ally reduces output growth.3 In both cases it is the increasing threat
of reduction in the return of invested capital (or even the risk of
expropriation) that reduces the agents’ willingness to invest in 
physical capital, thus depressing the potential for growth.
The second line of research considers the borrowing constraints in
financing access to education as the main explanation for the nega-
tive correlation between inequality and growth.4 The poorest parts of
the population do not possess resources to access education and
cannot find financial markets where they can borrow these resources
to send their children to school.5 In this case, fiscal redistribution is
efficient because it shifts resources from individuals with low rates of
return to liquidity-constrained agents with very high rates of return.6
Empirical tests of these two lines of research are still inconclu-
sive. Most authors find a negative correlation between inequality
and growth,7 but other contradictory results can be found in the 
literature.8 The real question is that it is not yet clear through which
variables it operates. The political economy explanation suffers
from a lack of evidence for a negative relationship between redis-
tribution and growth.9 Alesina and Perotti (1996) found evidence of
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a negative relationship between inequality and growth via a 
variable measuring political instability (first principal component
extracted from numbers of riots, assassination, coups); but their
analysis has no predictive power, and the possibility of measuring
political instability is questionable.10 It is more difficult to test the
second line of research in the absence of information at the indi-
vidual level about income and educational choices of the family.
Using aggregate data, Perotti (1994) found that a subjective quali-
tative measure of credit market rationing is statistically significant
in explaining growth only when interacted with income inequality.
However, the most convincing piece of evidence in this respect
comes from the comparison between Far Eastern countries and
Latin American ones. The former are characterized by lower
inequality and greater access to school, whereas the latter exhibit
the reverse situation; possibly for these different patterns, the first
area experienced sustained growth during the 1970s and 1980s,
while the second area underwent stagnation.11 Using household
surveys for 35 countries, Filmer and Pritchett (1998) have shown
that asset poverty (as measured by the first principal component
extracted from information on ownership of durable goods and
quality of housing) reduces school attainment in the poorest 40 per
cent of the population. Using aggregate data for a limited sample
of countries, Flug et al. (1998) found that secondary school enrol-
ments are affected negatively by income inequality.
The present study provides additional support to this second line
of research. It starts with an optimal demand for education and
explores under which conditions the number of years of schooling
can be correlated to family income. On one side, optimal demand for
schooling could be positively associated with unobservable ability; if
ability is transmitted intergenerationally, we could get positive 
correlation between family income and children’s schooling. On the
other side, if liquidity constraints prevent school attendance by chil-
dren from poor families, we observe correlation between educational
choices and family incomes, at least in the lower tail of income dis-
tribution. We then prove that, under given assumptions, enrolment
rates and measures of income inequality (namely the Gini index)
should be negatively correlated. However, following the liquidity-
constraints explanation, the Gini coefficient should be negatively
correlated each time missing financial markets create a barrier to
accessing education for the poorest families. Contrariwise, if the
intergenerational transmission of talent is a valid explanation, edu-
cational attainments and income distribution should be positively
Inequality in Incomes and Access to Education 3
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correlated at any stage of education. Since our empirical estimates
prove a robust negative correlation at the secondary level for all the
population, and at primary and tertiary levels for a gender compo-
nent only, we believe that these results bring support to the view that
poor families are prevented from accessing school by their low
incomes. Thus, greater income inequality reduces access to school.
Provided cumulated human capital affects income growth,12 we
strengthen the second line of interpretation of the negative relation-
ship between inequality and growth.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section studies the
relationship between individual demand for schooling and aggre-
gate distribution of income. Section 3 describes the data set and
Section 4 presents the estimates of school enrolment rates at dif-
ferent levels (primary, secondary and tertiary) in an unbalanced
panel of 108 countries for the period 1960–95. The final section 
contains concluding remarks.
2. Individual demand for education and aggregate 
income distribution
Following the work of Becker (1993) and Card (1999), the
optimal demand for schooling is derived by equating decreasing
marginal benefits (because lengthening school attendance reduces
working life) and increasing marginal cost (because of the direct
cost of higher stages of education and the opportunity cost of
foregone incomes). The demand for schooling decreases with the
intertemporal discount rate and with direct costs of schooling, and
increases with the return to education and the resources publicly
invested in education (provided they increase the production of
human capital). When agents are heterogeneous in ability, better
talented children obtain more human capital (because they benefit
more from schooling and they stay longer at school) and therefore
earn more (Card, 1999). When agents are heterogeneous in family
income and financial markets are imperfect, children from poor
families obtain less education because they face higher costs, and
earn less in the labour market. These two polar cases of hetero-
geneity, respectively named ‘elitist’ and ‘equalitarian’ by Becker
(1993), rather then being mutually excluding, usually coexist. Both
heterogeneities can be transmitted intergenerationally. Inequality in
family resources may prevent access to education, thus re-creating
income inequality in the next generation. Contrariwise, when un-
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observable ability is correlated across generations, better-endowed
parents are more likely to get endowed children. In both cases we
empirically observe low intergenerational mobility in educational
achievements and measures. Thus, when we take a snapshot of
income distribution, we are unable to distinguish whether the poor
are so because they are less talented or because they are the de-
scendants of poor families.13 Unless one has access to individual
data with reasonable proxies for unobservable ability for at least two
generations, the two cases are observationally equivalent. The
debate between supporters of a ‘natural’ explanation and defend-
ers of the ‘imperfect market’ explanation of inequality has not yet
reached a definite conclusion, given the lack of natural experiments
to discriminate between the two, and we suspect it never will.14 Since
individual data sets containing proxy variables for ability do not
exist for a sufficient number of countries, we have to resort to indi-
rect aggregate evidence. If educational achievements and family in-
comes are correlated across generations at the level of individuals
(either for imperfect financial markets or for persistence in unob-
served ability), then the distribution of income in one generation is
correlated with access to education in the next one. The shape of
this relationship is the object of our investigation.
We start with a standard human capital relationship between
earned income and educational achievement:
[1]
The income Xit+1 earned by individual i when an adult depends on
her educational achievement when young Sit, on her endowment of
unobservable ability Hit, and on good/bad luck in the labour market
eit+1. If the individual maximizes her expected income, given a
budget constraint (where the access to education can be limited 
by inherited family resources) and a ‘production’ technology for
human capital, we obtain the optimal choice of schooling:
[2]
The individual will demand more education the higher her un-
observable ability Hit (because talented people have more success in
school, drop out less and stay in school longer), the higher the
family income Xit (since family income can limit the access to edu-
cation when financial markets are imperfect or even absent), the
higher the expected return of education in the labour market Rt,
S g H X R Eit it it t t= ( )
+ + + +
, , .
X f S Hit it it it+
+ +
+= ( ) +1 1, .e
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and the higher the public resources invested in education Et (which
may lower the access cost to education, provide better-quality edu-
cation and/or improve the cultural environment).
If unobserved ability is correlated across generations:
[3]
By replacing equation [3] into equation [1] we get:
[4]
By lagging equation [1] by one generation and inverting with respect
to parents’ ability (Becker, Tomes, 1986) we obtain:
[5]
Finally by introducing equation [5] into equation [4] we get:
[6]
In this way we see that parents’ income is correlated with their 
children’s educational choices through two possible channels. The
former (which we term ‘ability’) summarizes the fact that brighter
parents earn more, give birth to brighter children, who in turn
achieve more education. The latter (which we term ‘liquidity con-
straint’) indicates that under imperfect financial markets the poorest
fraction of the population may be prevented from accessing school.
If we log-linearize equation [6] we obtain:
[7]
where st = log(St), xt = log(Xt), rt = log(Rt) and et = log(Et). The case
a2 π 0 suggests ability persistence, whereas a3 π 0 indicates liquid-
ity constraints. In principle, two cases could be empirically dis-
criminated.15 Since our theoretical expectations are a2 > 0 and a3 ≥
0 (zero being the limiting case of perfect financial markets), if we
do not find evidence of correlation between children’s educational
choices and parents’ incomes we can infer that both ‘ability’ and
‘liquidity constraints’ channels of persistence are absent. Contrari-
wise, finding positive correlation potentially allows for both expla-
nations. However, the ‘ability’ channel should operate at all stages
of education (i.e. a2 must be positive at all stages of educational
choice), whereas the ‘liquidity’ channel could operate at some stages
s s x x eit it it it t t= + + + + +-a a a a a r a0 1 1 2 3 4 5 ,
S g h l S X X R Eit it it it t t= ( )( )( )-
+ + + +
1, , , .
H l S Xit it it- -
+ +
= ( )1 1, .
S g h H X R Eit it it t t= ( )( )-
+ + + +
1 , , .
H h Hit it= ( )-
+
1 .
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of education but not at others (typically for non-compulsory and/or
lower stages of education). But we cannot proceed any further
without individual information about education and family back-
ground, and unfortunately these data sets exist mainly for devel-
oped countries and for recent years.
If we wish to extend our analysis to a larger set of countries and
years, we have to resort to aggregate information. Therefore, we
need to develop the aggregate implications of the model described
by equation [7]. We introduce the assumption that incomes X are
log-normally distributed, that is log(X) = x ~ N(mx, ). As a con-
sequence of the log-linearity of equation [7], educational choices
will be normally distributed in the subsequent generation, condi-
tional on the ‘ability’ and/or the ‘liquidity’ channel being operative.
We will exploit known properties of normal distributions to prove
the following proposition:
Proposition 1: Under the assumptions of validity of model [7] and
log-normal distribution for incomes X, and conditional on a given
income mean, the enrolment rates to school (namely the proportion
of the reference population attending school) are linearly related 
to specific inequality measures (like the Gini concentration index)
obtained from income distribution.
Proof. The enrolment rate P represents the fraction of the popula-
tion aiming to achieve an amount of education exceeding the legal
duration of a given stage of school. In symbols:
[8]
where n1, n2 and n3 are, respectively, the numbers of years required
to complete the primary, secondary or tertiary level of education,
and f(S) is the density function of S. The Gini concentration index
on income distribution can be represented as:16
[9]
where g(X ) is the density function of X and the term in square
brackets is the vertical distance between the Lorenz curve and the
G F X Q X g X X Q X
X
tg t tX
X
= ( ) - ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) = ( )
•
Ú Ú2
1
0 0
d d, ,
P f S S
P f S S
P f S S
n
n
n
1
2
3
1
2
3
= = ( )
= = ( )
= = ( )
•
•
•
Ú
Ú
Ú
primary school enrolment d
secondary school enrolment d
tertiary school enrolment d ,
s x2
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perfect equality relationship. Given the log-normality assumption,
log(X) = x ~ N(mx, ) and its density function is given by:
[10]
The associated Gini index is:
[11]
We can rewrite equation [7] in a more compact form as:
[12]
where g0 incorporates all shift parameters for the entire distribution.
As a consequence of the linearity assumption, s is normally distrib-
uted, i.e. s ~ N(g0 + g1mx, ) and its density function is given by:
[13]
Enrolment rates can now be redefined as:17
[14]
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The intuition underlying this relationship can be grasped with 
reference to Figure 1. In the upper quadrant there are two normal
density functions, the solid line corresponding to the case of mx =
0, = 1, and the dashed line to the case of mx = 0, = 2. This
translates below into the corresponding cumulative distribution
function (north-east quadrant). Assuming a linear combination of
the type s = 0.5 + 0.8 ·x (south-east quadrant), this maps the cumu-
lative distribution function of s ~ N (0.5, 0.64) or s ~ N(0.5, 1.28)
(south-west quadrant). In the last (north-west) quadrant we have
reported the Lorenz curve corresponding to the distribution of X.18
Now let us consider an increase in the dispersion of incomes around
a given mean (i.e. the passage from the solid to the dashed line).
This implies an increase in the population share with an income
below any given value, and correspondingly an increase in the popu-
lation share that is unable to achieve the income threshold that is
necessary to access a fixed amount of education. At the same time,
the Gini concentration index for incomes increases. We find cor-
roboration of the negative association of the Gini index for incomes
and school participation rates.19
Summing up, in the context of optimal demand of schooling with
heterogeneous agents we have shown that educational attainment
and family income are positively correlated. As long as it is pos-
sible to control for the mean income and other variables affecting
the educational choice in the aggregate (cost of accessing the
school, public resources devoted to education, wage premium for
educated workers in the labour market and stage of development),
we expect to find a negative relationship between the Gini concen-
tration index on income distribution and enrolment rates at any
level of education. In the sequel we find an existing negative rela-
tionship either at the secondary level of education or for the female
component only. These results are incompatible with a relationship
between educational achievement and family income based on the
transmission of talent. In fact, if the brightest students are the off-
spring of the richest families, we should observe the same relation-
ship subsisting at any stage of education and for both the male and
female components of the young cohorts. Contrariwise, finding that
this relationship exists for specific educational choices (going
beyond compulsory education or investing in a daughter’s future)
does not contradict the idea of existing liquidity constraints in edu-
cational choices.
s x2s x2
LABR1  3/6/03  07:30 PM  Page 9
10 Daniele  Checchi
© CEIS, Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2003.
Figure 1. The effect of an increase in income distribution
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3. Data description
The data utilized in this analysis come from different sources:
data on educational achievements and school quality are from
Barro and Lee (1993, 1994, 1996, 1997);20 data on income inequal-
ity are from Deininger and Squire (1996);21 data on physical capital
stocks are from Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993); finally, data on
female fertility, child mortality and population growth have been
extracted from the World Bank (1998). In all cases the series have
been updated to 1995, when available, using World Bank (1998) and
UNESCO (1998) data. Data refer to 108 countries for the period
1960–95 and report information at quinquennial intervals: there-
fore, at best we have eight observations for each country. However,
with a theoretical dimension of the data set equal to 864 observa-
tions (108 ¥ 8), missing information (mainly on income distribution)
reduces it by more than one-third, transforming it into an un-
balanced panel. For the main variables (income inequality indices,
enrolment rates, gross national product and population) we rely on
470 observations (with an average of 4.3 observations per country),
but in most cases when considering additional information this
number has to be reduced even further. Descriptive statistics 
about these main variables are reported in Table 1 (entire data set),
whereas information on additional control variables available is
reported in Table A2 in the Appendix. Regional averages are also
reported in the Appendix (Tables A1a–A1g).
On the whole, these data cover almost half of the 210 countries
listed by the World Bank (1998), but account for 86.3 per cent of
the world population (as measured in 1990). Given the fact that this
data set is forcibly tailored according to the availability of income
distribution data, one may suspect the possible introduction of
sample bias. In order to check this possibility, using all the avail-
able information on a larger sample of 132 countries, we have run
a panel probit regression predicting the availability of data on
income distribution (see Table A3 in the Appendix). The results are
reassuring: there is only evidence of easier availability of data for
larger countries (in terms of population) and for less recent years.
In particular, availability of information on income distribution
seems unrelated to information on school enrolment at primary and
secondary level, whereas it is positively correlated with higher edu-
cation (since countries with a better-educated labour forces have
easier access to income data). Therefore, we think that this data set
Inequality in Incomes and Access to Education 11
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may provide a representative picture at world level of the determi-
nants of schooling participation.
Looking at the descriptive statistics (Table 1), we find evidence 
of well-known stylized facts. In the aggregate data, inequality in
income distribution declined during the 1960s and the 1970s, then
showed an upward surge during the 1980s. However, when looking
at regional areas, we cannot find a uniform pattern, thus providing
some support to the argument that inequality does not exhibit a
specific trend since 1960.22 Inequality is highest in sub-Saharan
Africa and Latin America, and lower in industrialized countries and
South Asia. Educational achievements rose quickly during the first
two decades, but this rise slowed during the 1980s. By the beginning
of the 1990s, many countries ended up having all the population
enrolled in primary education (OECD countries, Latin America,
North Africa and East Asia). However, while OECD countries have
almost reached complete saturation also for the second stage of
secondary education, all the other countries are still lagging behind,
the worst situation being recorded for sub-Saharan and South-
Asian countries. An analogous picture emerges when looking at
higher education. Graphical inspection of the association between
school enrolment and income inequality confirms that most of the
countries have achieved full participation in education at the
primary level, thus reducing the potential variation in the former
variable (see Figure 2). Contrariwise, at the secondary and tertiary
levels of education, a negative correlation emerges clearly (see
Figures 3 and 4). However, at this stage we do not know whether
this evidence is the result of spurious correlation (when, for
example, inequality and school participation are both functions of
the stage of development) or whether it represents a genuine effect.
To ascertain the nature of this effect we have to move to multi-
variate regressions.
4. Empirical analysis
In the sequel we investigate the determinants of enrolment rates
at different stages of education, and in particular we will concen-
trate on the effects of income distribution.23 In line with the model
introduced in Section 2, the observed enrolment rate is a reduced
form incorporating elements describing household behaviour
(demand for schooling) and government provision of this public
service (supply of schooling).24 On the supply side, information
Inequality in Incomes and Access to Education 13
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Figure 2. Income inequality and education — primary education
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Figure 3. Income inequality and education — secondary education
gr
os
s 
en
ro
ll r
t s
ec
n 
ed
uc
at
io
n
All countries by year - secondary education
gini index of inequality
year==60
0
1.35
year==65 year==70
year==75
0
1.35
year==80 year==85
.2 1
year==90
.2 1
0
1.35
year==95
.2 1
LABR1  3/6/03  07:30 PM  Page 14
about state spending, employed teachers and repetition rate is 
available; on the demand side, beyond information about income
distribution, we will consider demographic factors (birth rates),
family composition (fertility rates) and socio-cultural environment
(proxied here by the mortality rates). Given that schooling is a
stage-by-stage process (one cannot enrol at university unless one has
completed secondary school), educational achievement at a certain
stage is conditioned by the achievement obtained at the previous
stage (what we term the ‘ratchet effect’): given the absence of
detailed information on schooling flows, we will proxy this effect
with the average achievement of the entire population for that level
of education.25 Finally, we will control for the stage of development
by conditioning on the level of real GNP per capita.
4.1 Primary education
Full enrolment for primary education has been almost completely
achieved by all countries, especially in recent years. The public push
towards attending compulsory education has lowered any cost
barrier to accessing education, at least at this stage. We do not find
Inequality in Incomes and Access to Education 15
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Figure 4. Income inequality and education — tertiary education
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evidence of any negative effect of income distribution (as measured
by Gini indices) on gross enrolment for primary education.26
However, since the same Gini index can be associated with differ-
ent Lorenz curves, we have also experimented with the income share
accruing to the poorest segment of the population, the lowest 
quintile. In this case, the variable is statistically weakly significant.
Columns 1–4 of Table 2 report the country fixed-effects OLS regres-
16 Daniele  Checchi
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Table 2. Estimation of primary education enrolment — fixed effects,
1960–95
Dependent variable: gross enrolment 
Estimated coefficients
rate in primary education Total Total Total Female
Gini index of income distribution 0.02 -0.20 — -0.11
(0.33) (1.34) (1.35)
Income share of the lowest quintile — -0.57 — —
in income distribution (1.06)
(Log of) real GDP per capita 0.04 0.05 — 0.04
(2.20) (3.08) (2.05)
(Log of) inequality-adjusted real — — 0.03 —
GNP per capita (1.86)
Child mortality rate in the first -2.48 -2.13 -2.49 -3.14
year (per 1,000 births) (8.05) (7.57) (8.09) (8.98)
Fertility rate (potential children 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.08
per woman) (7.30) (6.21) (7.24) (7.29)
Crude birth rate (per 1,000 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
inhabitants) (5.78) (5.75) (5.76) (5.00)
Share of the corresponding 0.014 0.011 0.016 0.12
population over 15 with some (0.29) (0.24) (0.32) (2.14)
primary education
Students per teacher in primary 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001
education (2.57) (3.46) (2.50) (1.80)
Constant 0.59 0.60 0.71 0.55
(3.31) (3.16) (4.65) (2.70)
No. of observations/No. of 436/92 303/84 436/92 424/92
countries
Correlation between random 0.09 0.03 0.10 0.15
component and individual 
explanatory variables
R2 overall 0.54 0.50 0.52 0.62
R2 within 0.43 0.51 0.43 0.46
F-test 36.34 28.10 42.11 40.69
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: t-statistics in parentheses.
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sions.27 However, a negative correlation still exists for the female
component of the student population: column 4 of Table 2 re-
estimates column 1 by restricting consideration to female primary
enrolment, and again we find a weakly negative significant impact
of income distribution. This could be taken as evidence that expan-
sion of compulsory education has benefited mainly boys, irrespec-
tive of the availability of financial resources from the family. Since
we do not have good reason to believe that talent is unequally dis-
tributed according to gender, we consider this result as the first piece
of evidence in favour of the borrowing-constraints interpretation 
of the negative correlation between Gini index and enrolment rates.
It is noteworthy that the same effect does not carry over to the
random-effects estimation, or in cross-section:28 this could imply
that there is something that is country specific in this effect. In other
words, financial resources still preclude the access to primary edu-
cation of girls from poor families in some areas of the world. Why
families might be more willing to afford educational expenditure for
boys than for girls is strongly intertwined with cultural habits.29 In
effects, when we control for this possibility using random-effects
estimation on regional sub-samples, we find that this result is attrib-
utable to East-Asian countries and, to a lesser extent, to Latin
American ones. Some additional effect of income distribution can
be found when looking at mortality rates. If we take child mortal-
ity as a proxy for extreme poverty, we find a significant negative
impact on enrolment into primary education.30
The process of schooling (even at primary level) is obviously
related to the stage of development of a country. If we measure this
stage with the (real) gross domestic product per capita, effectively
we find that primary enrolment is positively associated with its 
logarithm. But exploiting a suggestion originally advanced by Sen
(1976), and subsequently followed by international agencies as a
starting point for measuring the degree of human development,31
we correct the level of per capita product Y with the contempora-
neous Gini concentration index G, thus obtaining a measure of
‘inequality-adjusted real income’ Yadjust:
[15]
Introducing this regressor instead of logY and G as separate 
regressors corresponds (approximately) to imposing an equality
restriction on their coefficients obtained in column 1, which 
cannot be rejected by the data: the restriction ‘coefficient(logY ) 
Y Y Gadjust = ◊ -( )1 .
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= -coefficient(G)’ in column 1 of Table 2 has an F-test value of
(1,337) = 0.70 ( p = 0.40). Notice that when using the logarithm 
of Yadjust a 1 per cent increase in Y is (approximately) equivalent to
a 1-point reduction in the Gini index. The variable Yadjust comes out
highly significant, with a rather low semi-elasticity of 0.03 (column
3 of Table 2); it implies that in order to obtain an increase in
primary enrolment of 1 per cent one would require an increase 
in per capita income of 33 per cent, maintaining the inequality in
income distribution constant. All the other variables retain their
previous signs and significance.
On the supply side, one finds evidence of a negative impact of
population growth (as measured by the crude birth rate), because
it necessarily implies a decline of per child resources. It is also 
true that, for many countries, the limited resources available may
prevent school attendance.32 This could explain the rather counter-
intuitive result of the number of students per teacher exhibiting a
significant and positive impact (instead of a negative one, as one
would have expected when thinking of greater resources and better
quality being associated with lower values of this variable). In
other words, a greater number of students per teacher would indi-
cate a country’s effort to catch up with full attendance in primary
education.33
On the demand side, family background seems to account for
some variation. If we take the fertility rate34 as proportional to the
average number of children in a family, we could expect either nega-
tive or positive effects. The former case applies when resources are
binding — the greater the number of children in a family, the lower
the resources per capita, and the greater the opportunity cost of
school attendance. Contrariwise, the latter case applies when sup-
portive effects could be accounted for; in this case, the larger the
number of siblings, the higher the probability that someone else has
already had some schooling experience, and therefore the greater
the chance of getting some help at home.35 The relevance of the 
cultural environment (the so-called social capital) is also witnessed
by the positive effect played by the stock of people with some (but
incomplete) primary education. The positive effect could be
explained on two grounds. On one side, some of the population
(older than 15 years) with uncompleted primary education could
re-enrol into primary education, thus raising the gross rate of enrol-
ment. On the other side, it may be correlated with the effort of a
country to overcome illiteracy, and therefore it describes the pres-
sure put on children to enrol and complete primary education.36
18 Daniele  Checchi
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We were unable to find strong effects of public resources invested
in education on enrolment. Using a subset of countries for which
educational resources information is available, a richer specifica-
tion does not provide any improvement on previous results. While
income inequality remains insignificant, all the proxies used to
capture different aspects of publicly invested resources tend to be
insignificant. Additional resources invested in education can take
different forms: fewer students per teacher, better-paid teachers, a
greater ratio of governmental current expenditure on primary edu-
cation per pupil on per capita GDP (or simply a greater share of
education expenditure on GDP), and a greater share of educational
resources invested in buildings and equipment. Or we could even
look at more care devoted to attending children, negatively proxied
by drop-out and repetition rates. In accordance with the previous
model, we expect that an increase in public resources ceteris paribus
should facilitate school attendance, and therefore increase school
enrolment. In all these cases, with the exception of teachers’ pay
and drop-out rates, we do not find strong evidence of positive effects
of more resources on primary enrolment. The case of drop-out rate
could be due to different regional patterns.37 The case of teachers’
pay is inconclusive: for given resources, having better-paid teachers
necessarily implies having fewer teachers, fewer or more crowded
classes, and consequently less availability in terms of educational
service. This is, for example, the explanation advanced by Ridker
(1994) for the decline in primary enrolment for sub-Saharan Africa
in the last decade.38
4.2 Secondary education
When considering secondary education, we find a strong corre-
lation between income distribution and school enrolment. The Gini
index comes out significantly negative: a 1-point decline in the 
index (more equalitarian distribution) implies a 0.25 per cent rise
in secondary enrolment (column 1 of Table 3). The same effect is
obtained when considering inequality-adjusted real income Yadjust,
with a somehow lower impact (column 3 of Table 3).39 Also in this
case we find additional evidence of possible discrimination against
girls: a significant increase in inequality (say a DGini of +0.05)
reduces secondary school enrolment to 1 per cent for boys and 1.8
per cent for girls.40 Notice, in addition, that the coefficient measur-
ing the impact of inequality for girls is larger than in the case of
primary school (-0.35 against -0.11), and this suggests that finan-
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cial constraints are more relevant at this stage of education. It is
interesting also to note that liquidity constraints seem to affect the
whole span of income distribution, since the coefficient of the
income share of the lowest quintile is not significantly different
from 0.41
On the demand side we find evidence of some effect in terms of
family composition, as proxied by the fertility rate. While this vari-
able exhibits a positive effect at primary level (and was explained
there as evidence of the effort of a supportive effect within the
family), in this case it presents a clearly negative impact, which can
20 Daniele  Checchi
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Table 3. Estimation of secondary education enrolment — fixed effects,
1960–95
Dependent variable: gross enrolment 
Estimated coefficients
rate in primary education Total Total Total Female
Gini index of income distribution -0.24 0.01 — -0.35
(2.68) (0.06) (3.73)
Income share of the lowest quintile — 0.69 — —
in income distribution (0.88)
(Log of) real GDP per capita 0.14 0.15 — 0.15
(6.37) (6.03) (6.37)
(Log of) inequality-adjusted real — — 0.13 —
GNP per capita (7.17)
Fertility rate (potential children -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06
per woman) (5.33) (5.62) (5.34) (6.03)
Average years of completed 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.06
primary education in the (6.15) (3.42) (6.10) (5.20)
corresponding population over 15
Ratio of physical capital stock to 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05
GDP (1987 local prices) (3.26) (3.40) (3.56) (3.81)
Constant -0.67 -0.82 -0.67 -0.65
(3.31) (3.05) (3.93) (3.07)
No. of observations/No. of 386/76 264/69 386/76 369/76
countries
Correlation between random -0.65 -0.58 -0.64 -0.73
component and individual 
explanatory variables
R2 overall 0.79 0.76 0.79 0.82
R2 within 0.65 0.68 0.65 0.69
F-test 115.1 67.27 143.3 127.7
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: t-statistics in parentheses.
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be interpreted as evidence of a family resource effect. If we con-
sider that sending a child to a secondary school (which in most
countries exceeds the threshold of compulsory education) is a more
demanding task (at least on the financial side), an increase in family
size implies a reduction in resources per child (in terms both of
income, partially captured by the inequality and output per capita
variables, and time devoted to children by the parents).
On the supply side we find weak effects of resources invested in
education; the number of pupils per teacher, the ratio of govern-
mental current expenditure on secondary education per pupil on
GDP per capita, the repetition rate, the aggregate expenditure on
education (as a share on GDP) and its composition; all variables
exert a statistically insignificant effect (columns 2 and 5 in Table 4).42
However, when we interact data for public expenditure on educa-
tion with the Gini index on income distribution, we find that their
impact becomes significant: an increase in public resources devoted
to current expenditure on education raises secondary enrolment,
especially for countries with very unequal income distribution.43
The Gini index remains negatively significant; in addition, when we
take the total derivative of secondary enrolment with respect to the
Gini index from the third column we get:
[16]
which evaluated at sample means is equal to -0.49. We take this
result as a second piece of evidence in support of a liquidity con-
straint interpretation of the relationship between income distribu-
tion and school enrolment. Had this relationship been attributable
to talent transmission, we would have expected the opposite result.
Since more talented students take more advantage of greater
resources invested in education,44 we should find that an increase
in public expenditure widens the dispersion of educational achieve-
ments and, ceteris paribus, strengthens the relationship between
secondary enrolment and the Gini index of income distribution.
Contrariwise, if the relationship is attributable to liquidity con-
straints, an increase in public expenditure lowers the barriers to
access, and weakens the same relationship; this is what we infer
from equation [16]. In other words, public resources do not have a
direct impact, but they are effective in easing family choices in 
d
d
enrolment
Gini index
educ. exp. GDP
capital exp. total exp.
= - + ( )
+ ( )
2 11 28 86
2 33
. .
. ,
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Table 4. Estimation of secondary education enrolment using different
variables for educational resources — fixed effects, 1960–95
Dependent variable: gross 
enrolment rate
Estimated coefficients
in secondary education Total Total Total Female Female Female
Gini index of income -0.38 -0.33 -2.11 -0.40 -0.35 -2.44
distribution (2.71) (2.18) (4.68) (2.66) (2.20) (5.17)
(Log of) real GDP per 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.21 0.19 0.14
capita (5.44) (5.00) (4.13) (5.13) (4.44) (3.37)
Fertility rate (potential -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
children per woman) (2.27) (1.82) (1.87) (1.92) (1.65) (1.79)
Average years of completed 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.13
primary education in (3.25) (2.85) (4.04) (3.47) (3.13) (4.63)
the corresponding 
population over 15
Ratio of physical capital 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03
stock to GDP (1987 (1.74) (1.74) (1.78) (1.89) (1.69) (1.58)
local prices)
Students per teacher in — 0.001 0.002 — 0.0001 0.001
secondary education (0.40) (1.02) (0.03) (0.73)
Repetition rate — — 0.001 0.02 — 0.001 0.003
secondary education (0.68) (1.42) (0.75) (1.59)
Per pupil government — -0.001 -0.001 — -0.0007 -0.001
expenditure on (1.19) (1.25) (0.70) (0.77)
secondary education/
GDP per capita
Government expenditure — -0.08 -10.70 — 0.28 -11.19
on education/GDP (0.09) (3.80) (0.29) (3.80)
(Government expenditure — — 28.86 — — 31.9
on education/GDP) ¥
Gini index (4.00) (4.22)
Capital expenditure/total — -0.23 -1.11 — -0.30 -1.79
government expenditure (1.64) (2.28) (2.02) (3.48)
on education
(Capital expenditure/total — — 2.33 — — 3.89
government expenditure (1.99) (3.13)
on education) ¥ Gini index
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations/No. 133/50 133/50 133/50 130/49 130/49 130/49
of countries
Correlation between -0.75 -0.71 -0.71 -0.82 -0.80 -0.80
random component 
and individual 
explanatory variables
R2 overall 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.83 0.82 0.82
R2 within 0.76 0.77 0.82 0.77 0.79 0.84
F-test 49.0 25.1 26.7 52.9 27.2 31.1
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note:t-statistics in parentheses.
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relation to letting their children proceed further in their educational
career.
Another aspect related to the public supply of secondary edu-
cation has to do with the ‘vertical integration’ of this process; if
we consider that a student can enrol in a secondary school only if
s/he has completed the primary level, evidently an increase in the
completion of primary education provides additional inputs to 
the next stage of production. This ‘ratchet effect’ makes it rather
implausible to observe enrolment rates at higher stages greater
than those observed at lower stages. Effectively, we find that the
average number of years of completed primary education in the
population45 play a significant positive effect; raising the sample
mean (3.94 years) by an additional year should induce an increase
in secondary enrolment in the order of 4–6 percentage points,
depending on the chosen specification. Family choices also seem
to respond to the existing situation in the labour market,
probably via differential returns for education and/or differential
employment probability.46 Under the assumption of complemen-
tarities between human and physical capital in production,47 we
can approximate the skill requirement in the economy with exist-
ing capital intensity (the ratio of physical capital to output). In
such a case, we observe that an increase in demand for skills in the
labour market (i.e. an increase in capital/output ratio) induces an
increase in secondary school enrolment. However, the size of the
effect is not very great; a 10 per cent increase in capital/output
ratio (from an average of 2.58 to 2.84) would raise secondary
enrolment just 0.4 per cent.48
4.3 Higher education
Moving finally to higher education, as found in the case of
primary education we find weak evidence of direct impact of either
income inequality or first quintile shares on higher education enrol-
ment (columns 1 and 2 in Table 5).49 Given the fact that many
authors stress that public finance of tertiary education has a regres-
sive effect because the offspring of the middle classes are over-
represented, we have also tested the possible existence of liquidity
constraints within this group by using the income share of each
quintile (taken either separately or jointly), but we could not 
detect any statistically significant effect. When we make use of the
inequality-adjusted real income Yadjust, the variable is significant but
the result is driven mainly by the underlying effect of output per
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capita.50 More surprising is the result that income inequality seems
to affect male enrolment more than female enrolment. The differ-
ences in sample averages between the enrolment rates of the two
genders are not very pronounced (16.2 per cent for men against 11.4
per cent for women), and therefore we cannot explain it with a com-
position effect. The talent transmission explanation cannot account
for this difference, unless we pursue a self-selectivity explanation:
males and females have different preferences, and the latter with-
draw from education more frequently than the former. But we
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Table 5. Estimation of higher education enrolment — fixed effects,
1960–95
Dependent variable: gross enrolment 
Estimated coefficients
rate in higher education Total Total Total Female Male
Gini index of income distribution -0.07 0.14 — -0.07 -0.13
(0.92) (0.68) (1.05) (2.10)
Income share of the lowest quintile — 0.61 — — —
in income distribution (0.83)
(Log of) real GDP per capita 0.08 0.14 — 0.04 0.08
(3.91) (4.11) (2.24) (4.07)
(Log of) inequality-adjusted real — — 0.07 — —
GNP per capita (3.97)
(Log of) government current 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01
expenditure in secondary (2.13) (1.51) (2.52) (2.87) (0.77)
education per pupil (PPP-
adjusted 1985 intn. prices)
Average years of completed 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.05
secondary education in the (5.88) (2.74) (5.97) (7.22) (4.88)
corresponding population over 15
Ratio of physical capital stock to 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02
GDP (1987 local prices) (1.06) (1.01) (1.45) (0.71) (2.57)
Constant -0.76 -1.39 -0.67 -0.51 -0.60
(5.08) (4.94) (5.83) (3.76) (4.51)
No. of observations/No. of countries 303/72 210/65 303/72 254/70 253/69
Correlation between random -0.59 -0.68 -0.55 -0.59 -0.39
component and individual
explanatory variables
R2 overall 0.63 0.57 0.63 0.59 0.60
R2 within 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.60 0.61
F-test 60.22 31.47 74.9 54.63 55.51
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: t-statistics in parentheses.
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believe that a more realistic explanation lies in the fact that the
daughters from financially constrained families have already aban-
doned school at earlier stages, and therefore the 11 per cent actu-
ally enrolled in school belong to rich families. Contrariwise, since
financial constraints restrain male enrolment starting only from 
secondary level, the selection according to family resources has
operated less strongly among them, and we can still find sons 
from middle-class families that are financially constrained when
asked to pay for enrolment at university. In our opinion this is a
third piece of evidence supporting the liquidity constraints line of
interpretation.
As far as the supply of higher education is concerned, there is
evidence of a positive effect of public expenditure per pupil at the
previous stage. If we take this variable as a proxy of the quality of
education provided at secondary school, this evidence suggests that
increasing the resources invested at one stage of education can be
ineffective in directly raising student participation at that level, but
can be beneficial in favouring the transition to the next stage (e.g.
by raising the self-confidence of the students). This impact is rather
low; a 10 per cent increase in public expenditure per student
enrolled in secondary school (equal to US$103 measured at 1985
prices) induces an increase of 0.21 percentage points in higher edu-
cation enrolment. The ratchet effect (namely the interdependence
between sequential stages of education) emerges also through the
positive effect exerted by the average years of secondary education
achieved in the population aged over 15 years; an additional year
(from a sample average of 1.4 years) induces an increase of almost
50 per cent in higher education enrolment.51 When considering
alternative measures relating to educational resources, we find only
a significantly positive effect of the total amount of public resources
invested in education on higher education enrolment. Other direct
measures of invested resources (such as students per teacher) do not
have direct information about the resources invested at this stage of
education.52 On the demand side, the only evidence comes from the
demand for skilled workers, as proxied by the capital/output ratio.
Even if the coefficient is lower than in the case of secondary edu-
cation, the elasticities are of comparable magnitude (see Table 6).
This is might indicate that the productive sector requires more tech-
nical training (provided mostly by secondary schools) than profes-
sional credentials provided by universities. Notice, moreover, that
the effect of this variable is significantly higher for men than for
women.
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5. Concluding remarks
In this paper we have examined some empirical evidence in
support of the negative correlation between inequality and growth.
Starting from a general model of optimal demand for education,
we have argued that the dependence on family income may derive
either from talent transmission or from borrowing constraints with
imperfect financial markets. In both cases, if family incomes are 
log-linearly distributed, we derive two testable predictions in the
analysis of aggregate data on school enrolments: a negative (linear)
dependence on the Gini concentration index on income distribu-
tion; and a positive dependence on public resources invested in 
education and/or on skill premiums in the labour market. These
predictions are then tested on a (unbalanced) panel of 108 coun-
tries for the period 1960–95.
The main findings of this analysis are summarized in Table 6.
Once we control for the degree of development with the (log of) per
capita output, income inequality seems relevant mainly in limiting
the access to secondary education. However, when we consider
gender differences, there is evidence that female participation in edu-
cation is more strongly conditioned by family income, starting from
primary education. Contrariwise, there is no clear evidence of a rel-
evant impact in terms of invested resources, except at the tertiary
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Table 6. Elasticities of enrolment at different educational levels
Primary Secondary Higher
Gini index of income distribution -0.011 -0.211** -0.185
(column 1 in Tables 2, 3, 5)
(Log of) inequality-adjusted real GNP 0.033* 0.281** 0.529**
per capita (column 3 in Tables 2, 3, 5)
Average years of completed education at 0.006** 0.520** 0.622**
previous stage (column 1 in Tables 2, 3, 5)
Ratio of physical capital stock to GDP — 0.215** 0.194
(column 1 in Tables 2, 3, 5)
Female only:
Gini index of income distribution -0.054 -0.311** -0.260
(column 4 in Tables 2, 3, 5)
Average years of completed education at 0.060* 0.467** 0.907**
previous stage (column 4 in Tables 2, 3, 5)
Notes: *Statistically significant at 95 per cent; **statistically significant at 99 per cent.
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level. Some positive effect is also played by labour demand for skilled
workers, which tends to raise enrolment in post-primary education.
Other conditioning variables, at primary and secondary level, are
fertility rates and mortality rates, which tend to capture other
aspects of social development. Finally, the data show that increas-
ing education at one stage raises the odds for subsequent stages.53
When we come to the interpretation of these results, we have
argued that there is clear evidence in favour of a borrowing con-
straint interpretation against a talent transmission reading. First,
we found differential effects of income inequality on male and
female enrolment rates. While still compatible with a differences-in-
preferences story, we believe that this is the reflection of family
behaviours: with scarce financial resources, traditionally families
invest more readily in boys’ than in girls’ education. Second, we
found that public resources affect secondary enrolment when inter-
acted with income inequality. We take this as evidence of public
expenditure on education alleviating family liquidity constraints.
The opposite reading, where the brightest children are the offspring
of the richest families, cannot account for these two facts.54
Provided our reading based on borrowing constraints is accepted,
income redistribution should matter for educational goals. The size
of the effect is not impressive: lowering the Gini index by 5 per-
centage points, a sizeable change at sample means, produces a total
increase in school participation of almost 2 percentage points.55
However, if one is willing to accept the conclusions of the present
study, when a country wants to raise the educational level of its 
population, rather than spending additional resources on building
schools and hiring teachers (which, at best, have an indirect 
effect on secondary school enrolments), it should rather implement
redistributive policies (via taxes and/or subsidies). Provided these
policies are effective in reducing income inequalities within the 
population, they are also capable of relaxing the financial con-
straints faced by the poorest families, and promoting school enrol-
ment. In the light of statistical irrelevance of invested resources in
promoting enrolment, any policy recommendation on expenditure
reallocation (e.g. from tertiary to primary, or vice versa) seems
pointless, given the limited impact of resources on school enrol-
ment.56 But a similar argument applies to the idea of expanding a
private provider of education. As long as school fees create an addi-
tional financial barrier to continuing education, we expect a reduc-
tion in total enrolment because it raises financial barriers against
financially constrained families.57
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Table A1a. Descriptive statistics — sub-Saharan Africa
Mean
entire Mean Mean Mean Mean
sample SD year = 60 year = 70 year = 80 year = 90
Gross enrolment  0.610 0.292 0.425 0.525 0.703 0.692
rate in primary (227)
education
Gross enrolment 0.135 0.135 0.038 0.078 0.149 0.213
rate in (220)
secondary 
education
Gross enrolment  0.013 0.019 0.002 0.007 0.013 0.025
rate in higher (221)
education
Gini index of 0.485 0.098 0.517 0.540 0.485 0.456
income (97)
distribution
Total population 10,221 15,314 6,058 7,929 10,573 13,670
(000s) (240)
Real GDP per  1,031.6 918.3 806 986 1,187 1,261
capita — US  (234)
dollars (1985 
international 
prices)
Notes: Numbers in parentheses report the number of non-missing observations in each
sample (or sub-sample). It includes 30 countries: Botswana, Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa,
Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
LABR1  3/6/03  07:31 PM  Page 28
Inequality in Incomes and Access to Education 29
© CEIS, Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2003.
Table A1b. Descriptive statistics — North Africa and the Middle East
Mean
entire Mean Mean Mean Mean
sample SD year = 60 year = 70 year = 80 year = 90
Gross enrolment 0.804 0.235 0.611 0.722 0.872 0.921
rate in primary (69)
education
Gross enrolment 0.397 0.260 0.192 0.276 0.474 0.637
rate in (68)
secondary 
education
Gross enrolment 0.087 0.092 0.021 0.045 0.111 0.136
rate in higher (70)
education
Gini index of 0.413 0.073 0.472 0.436 0.404 0.376
income (34)
distribution
Total population 15,210 15,835 9,032 11,817 15,311 20,419
(000s) (72)
Real GDP per 2,871.7 2,021.4 1,675 2,370 3,138 3,662
capita — US (67)
dollars (1985 
international 
prices)
Notes: Numbers in parentheses report the number of non-missing observations in each
sample (or sub-sample). It includes nine countries: Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia,
Iran, Israel, Jordan, North Yemen, and Cyprus.
LABR1  3/6/03  07:31 PM  Page 29
30 Daniele  Checchi
© CEIS, Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2003.
Table A1c. Descriptive statistics — East Asia and the Pacific
Mean
entire Mean Mean Mean Mean
sample SD year = 60 year = 70 year = 80 year = 90
Gross enrolment 0.931 0.147 0.853 0.908 0.960 0.964
rate in primary (86)
education
Gross enrolment 0.498 0.279 0.258 0.420 0.583 0.606
rate in (86)
secondary 
education
Gross enrolment 0.123 0.114 0.042 0.077 0.123 0.205
rate in higher (85)
education
Gini index of 0.403 0.071 0.439 0.397 0.389 0.397
income (67)
distribution
Total population 38,962 47,889 26,836 33,118 40,333 49,369
(000s) (85)
Real GDP per 3,860.4 3,513.2 1,480 2,648 4,389 6,612
capita — US (87)
dollars (1985 
international 
prices)
Notes: Numbers in parentheses report the number of non-missing observations in each
sample (or sub-sample). It includes 11 countries: Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan,
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Fiji, and Papua New
Guinea.
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Table A1d. Descriptive statistics — South Asia
Mean
entire Mean Mean Mean Mean
sample SD year = 60 year = 70 year = 80 year = 90
Gross enrolment 0.699 0.261 0.486 0.584 0.734 0.874
rate in primary (40)
education
Gross enrolment 0.277 0.174 0.144 0.230 0.270 0.390
rate in (40)
secondary 
education
Gross enrolment 0.036 0.024 0.010 0.031 0.040 0.046
rate in higher (40)
education
Gini index of 0.352 0.058 0.377 0.335 0.362 0.298
income (32)
distribution
Total population 172,884 263,567 112,602 142,258 178,410 221,599
(000s) (40)
Real GDP per 1,019.8 382.6 792 914 1,123 1,446
capita — US (40)
dollars (1985
international
prices)
Notes: Numbers in parentheses report the number of non-missing observations in each
sample (or sub-sample). It includes five countries: Bangladesh, India, Nepal,
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.
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Table A1e. Descriptive statistics — Latin America and the Caribbean
Mean
entire Mean Mean Mean Mean
sample SD year = 60 year = 70 year = 80 year = 90
Gross enrolment 0.951 0.117 0.872 0.932 0.965 0.970
rate in primary (180)
education
Gross enrolment 0.405 0.203 0.195 0.323 0.475 0.521
rate in (180)
secondary
education
Gross enrolment 0.117 0.092 0.029 0.064 0.138 0.186
rate in higher (179)
education
Gini index of 0.490 0.077 0.489 0.504 0.493 0.493
income (121)
distribution
Total population 14,142 26,831 8,848 11,658 14,889 18,114
(000s) (184)
Real GDP per 3,085.5 1,737.9 2,261 2,959 3,787 3,394
capita — US (183)
dollars (1985
international
prices)
Notes: Numbers in parentheses report the number of non-missing observations in each
sample (or sub-sample). It includes 23 countries: Barbados, Costa Rica, Dominica,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Trinidad
and Tobago, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana,
Paraguay, Peru, Surinam, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
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Table A1f. Descriptive statistics — OECD countries
Mean
entire Mean Mean Mean Mean
sample SD year = 60 year = 70 year = 80 year = 90
Gross enrolment 0.992 0.047 0.981 0.974 0.988 0.990
rate in primary (176)
education
Gross enrolment 0.773 0.254 0.485 0.690 0.807 0.905
rate in (174)
secondary 
education
Gross enrolment 0.253 0.175 0.089 0.164 0.249 0.387
rate in higher (175)
education
Gini index of 0.358 0.077 0.432 0.365 0.336 0.328
income (131)
distribution
Total population 29,227 46,967 24,833 27,756 30,142 31,717
(000s) (179)
Real GDP per 9,674.5 3,841.6 5,842 8,355 10,544 12,666
capita — US (179)
dollars (1985
international
prices)
Notes: Numbers in parentheses report the number of non-missing observations in each
sample (or sub-sample). It includes 23 countries: Australia, Austria, the Bahamas,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, (West) Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the UK, and the USA.
LABR1  3/6/03  07:31 PM  Page 33
34 Daniele  Checchi
© CEIS, Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2003.
Table A1g. Descriptive statistics — centrally planned economies
Mean
entire Mean Mean Mean Mean
sample SD year = 60 year = 70 year = 80 year = 90
Gross enrolment 0.978 0.082 1.000 0.965 0.987 0.912
rate in primary (34)
education
Gross enrolment 0.646 0.189 0.365 0.530 0.692 0.680
rate in (33)
secondary
education
Gross enrolment 0.168 0.091 0.078 0.133 0.174 0.142
rate in higher (27)
education
Gini index of 0.274 0.056 0.242 0.245 0.270 0.273
income (44)
distribution
Total population 269,046 415,109 337,947 425,523 509,219 196,341
(000s) (31)
Real GDP per 3,538.1 1,298.5 1,953 2,629 4,099 4,058
capita — US (34)
dollars (1985 
international
prices)
Notes: Numbers in parentheses report the number of non-missing observations in each
sample (or sub-sample). It includes seven countries: China, Hungary, Poland,
Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, and (former) Soviet Union.
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Table A2. Descriptive statistics, 1960–95
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
Gross enrolment rate in primary 470 0.900 0.190 0.050 1.350
education
Gross enrolment rate in secondary 470 0.482 0.291 0.005 1.065
education
Gross enrolment rate in higher 470 0.134 0.135 0.000 0.947
education
Gini index of income distribution 470 0.422 0.101 0.233 0.795
Income share of the lowest quintile 319 0.059 0.020 0.016 0.109
in income distribution
Fertility rate (potential children per 460 4.351 1.944 1.440 8.256
woman)
Crude birth rate (per 1,000 462 29.508 12.716 9.000 57.200
inhabitants)
Children mortality rate in the first 466 0.060 0.049 0.001 0.218
year (per 1,000 births)
Government current expenditure in 358 764.1 1,042.9 25.0 7,003.0
primary education per pupil — US 
dollars (PPP-adjusted 1985 
international prices)
Government current expenditure in 338 1,027.5 951.2 32.0 4,572.0
secondary education per pupil — 
US dollars (PPP-adjusted 1985 
international prices)
Students per teacher in primary 469 31.3 11.8 6.1 90.4
education
Students per teacher in secondary 447 19.5 6.7 6.1 44.2
education
Students per teacher in higher 193 15.7 10.6 4.3 127.8
education
Real GDP per capita — US dollars 470 4,524.9 4,061.0 308.0 18,399.0
(PPP-adjusted 1985 international 
prices)
Ratio of physical capital stock to 413 2.598 0.965 0.674 7.432
GDP (1987 local prices)
Share of the population over 15 with 430 43.49 17.85 2.2 90.1
some primary education
Average years of completed primary 428 3.941 1.758 0.2 8.1
education in the population over 15
Average years of completed secondary 430 1.331 0.987 0.0 5.1
education in the population over 15
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Table A3. Panel probit regression on the availability of income
distribution data — GEE population averaged model
regression — robust estimates, 1960–95
Dependent variable: (1: income data  Estimated Semi-robust
available; 0: income data not available) coefficients SE p-values
(Log of) real GDP per capita 0.013 0.030 0.672
(Log of) population 0.242 0.077 0.002
Growth rate of population -0.168 0.138 0.223
Gross enrolment rate in primary -0.036 0.064 0.570
education
Gross enrolment rate in secondary 0.034 0.044 0.431
education
Gross enrolment rate in higher 0.218 0.091 0.017
education
Dummy for OECD countries 0.600 0.553 0.278
Dummy for North African and  -1.044 0.487 0.032
Middle East countries
Dummy for sub-Saharan countries -0.502 0.468 0.283
Dummy for Latin American countries 0.661 0.655 0.313
Dummy for year = 1965 -0.029 0.010 0.007
Dummy for year = 1970 -0.055 0.020 0.006
Dummy for year = 1975 -0.085 0.030 0.005
Dummy for year = 1980 -0.120 0.040 0.003
Dummy for year = 1985 -0.157 0.049 0.001
Dummy for year = 1990 -0.190 0.058 0.001
Dummy for year = 1995 -0.209 0.068 0.002
Constant -0.880 0.861 0.307
No. of observations/No. of countries 891/132
c2 test 94.67 (0.00)
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Table A4. Estimation of primary enrolment — random-effects tobit
regressions, 1960–95
Dependent variable: gross enrolment 
Estimated coefficients
rate in primary education Total Total Total Female
Gini index of income distribution 0.15 -0.21 — -0.05
(0.11) (0.23) (0.13)
Income share of the lowest quintile — -0.58 — —
in income distribution (0.82)
(Log of) real GDP per capita 0.06 0.06 — 0.08
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
(Log of) inequality-adjusted real — — 0.04 —
GNP per capita (0.02)
Children mortality rate in the first -2.27 -1.72 -2.32 -2.88
year (per 1,000 births) (0.42) (0.36) (0.43) (0.47)
Fertility rate (potential children per 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07
woman) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Crude birth rate (per 1,000 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
inhabitants) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Share of the corresponding 0.20 0.15 0.20 0.27
population over 15 with some (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
primary education
Students per teacher in primary 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002
education (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Average salary primary school — — — —
teacher/GDP per capita
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations/No. of countries 436/92 303/84 436/92 433/92
Wald c2 test 381.4 305.1 328.6 415.5
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log-likelihood 23.33 34.65 21.11 9.28
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A5. Estimation of secondary enrolment — random-effects GLS
robust regressions, 1960–95
Dependent variable: gross enrolment 
Estimated coefficients
rate in primary education Total Total Total Female
Gini index of income distribution -0.27 -0.18 — -0.34
(0.10) (0.27) (0.11)
Income share of the lowest quintile — 0.15 — —
in income distribution (0.98)
(Log of) real GDP per capita 0.12 0.11 — 0.12
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
(Log of) inequality-adjusted real — — 0.12 —
GNP per capita (0.02)
Fertility rate (potential children -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05
per woman) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Average years of completed 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.04
primary education in the (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
corresponding population over 15
Ratio of physical capital stock to 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.05
GDP (1987 local prices) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations/No. of countries 386/76 264/69 386/76 369/76
c2 test 876.5 730.6 844.5 882.3
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A6. Estimation of higher education enrolment — random-effects
GLS robust regressions, 1960–95
Dependent variable: gross 
enrolment rate in primary  
Estimated coefficients
education Total Total Total Female Male
Gini index of income -0.08 0.05 — -0.08 -0.14
distribution (0.06) (0.21) (0.05) (0.05)
Income share of the lowest — 0.22 — — —
quintile in income (0.65)
distribution
(Log of) real GDP per 0.05 0.07 — 0.03 0.05
capita (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
(Log of) inequality-adjusted — — 0.05 — —
real GNP per capita (0.02)
(Log of) government current 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.004
expenditure in secondary (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
education per pupil (PPP-
adjusted 1985 international 
prices)
Average years of completed 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.05
secondary education in the (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
corresponding population 
over 15
Ratio of physical capital stock 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
to GDP (1987 local prices) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations/No. of 303/72 210/65 303/72 254/70 253/69
countries c2 test 270.3 178.6 264.7 194.7 398.2
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
LABR1  3/6/03  07:31 PM  Page 39
40 Daniele  Checchi
© CEIS, Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2003.
Table A7. Cross-section OLS and tobit regressions, 1960–95. Estimated
coefficients on Gini index
Total enrolment Female enrolment
Primary Primary 
Year Primary tobit Secondary Higher Primary tobit Secondary Higher
1960 0.049 -0.021 -0.257 -0.123 0.008 -0.142 -0.217 -0.045
(0.17) (0.06) (1.12) (1.26) (0.023) (0.28) (0.90) (0.69)
1965 0.232 0.502 0.067 -0.050 0.231 0.385 -0.038 -0.016
(1.20) (1.88) (0.34) (0.56) (1.12) (1.32) (0.18) (0.19)
1970 0.552 0.546 -0.376 -0.111 0.637 0.676 -0.242 -0.043
(2.95) (2.00) (2.18) (1.21) (3.53) (2.94) (1.31) (0.52)
1975 0.047 0.238 -0.562 -0.136 0.270 0.574 -0.255 -0.034
(0.224) (0.65) (2.03) (0.83) (1.06) (1.61) (0.86) (0.21)
1980 0.425 1.032 -0.545 -0.271 0.545 1.00 -0.256 -0.227
(2.63) (3.03) (2.33) (1.71) (2.75) (2.57) (1.01) (1.30)
1985 0.398 0.715 -0.634 0.115 0.582 1.11 -0.395 0.082
(2.43) (1.97) (2.79) (0.54) (3.06) (2.94) (1.93) (0.36)
1990 0.214 0.412 -0.468 -0.059 0.368 0.458 -0.219 n.a.
(1.58) (1.70) (2.58) (0.31) (2.27) (1.78) (1.16)
1995 0.496 0.060 -0.452 n.a. 0.644 0.286 -0.014 n.a.
(1.71) (0.18) (1.62) (1.54) (0.59) (0.06)
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. The specification for primary enrolment corresponds to the first
column of Table 2 and includes as regressors: log of real GDP per capita, child mortality, fer-
tility rate, crude birth rate, share of the population over 15 with some primary education, and
students per teacher. The specification for secondary enrolment corresponds to the first column
of Table 4 and includes as regressors: log of real GDP per capita, fertility rate, average year of
completed primary education in the population over 15, and ratio of capital stock to output.
The specification for higher enrolment corresponds to the first column of Table 6 and includes
as regressors: log of real GDP per capita, average year of completed secondary education in the
population over 15, expenditure per pupil in secondary education over GDP per capita, and
ratio of capital stock to output.
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Table A8. Regional effects on enrolment — random-effects GLS
regressions, 1960–95. Estimated coefficients on Gini index
Total enrolment Female enrolment
Primary Secondary Higher Primary Secondary Higher
Sub-Saharan 0.464 0.024 -0.007 0.332 0.058 -0.004
Africa (0.24) (0.19) (0.02) (0.24) (0.18) (0.00)
North Africa and 1.235 -2.46 0.565 1.759 -2.178 0.433
Middle East (0.40) (0.63) (0.33) (0.46) (0.63) (0.15)
East Asia and the -0.002 0.048 0.063 -0.522 0.243 -0.019
Pacific (0.21) (0.30) (0.19) (0.27) (0.34) (0.15)
South Asia 0.113 -0.324 -0.095 0.208 -0.355 0.021
(0.37) (0.25) (0.10) (0.35) (0.30) (0.10)
Latin America and -0.010 -0.029 -0.036 -0.109 -0.045 -0.085
the Caribbean (0.09) (0.13) (0.08) (0.09) (0.13) (0.08)
OECD countries 0.104 -0.067 0.070 -0.070 -0.349 0.121
(0.05) (0.16) (0.13) (0.09) (0.17) (0.10)
Centrally planned 0.769 n.a. n.a. 0.860 n.a. n.a.
economies (0.43) (0.61)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The specification for primary enrolment corresponds to
the first column of Table 2 and includes as regressors: log of real GDP per capita, child
mortality, fertility rate, crude birth rate, share of the population over 15 with some
primary education, and students per teacher. The specification for secondary enrolment
corresponds to the first column of Table 4 and includes as regressors: log of real GDP
per capita, fertility rate, average year of completed primary education in the population
over 15, and ratio of capital stock to output. The specification for higher enrolment cor-
responds to the first column of Table 6 and includes as regressors: log of real GDP per
capita, average year of completed secondary education in the population over 15, expen-
diture per pupil in secondary education over GDP per capita, and ratio of capital stock
to output.
LABR1  3/6/03  07:31 PM  Page 41
Notes
1 A good survey of the recent literature is contained in Benabou (1996c).
2 See Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), Perotti (1993),
Bertola (1993).
3 See Alesina and Perotti (1996). An additional variant is provided in Mauro
(1995), where inequality fosters corruption and depresses investment.
4 See Galor and Zeira (1993), Banerjee and Newman (1993), Torvik (1993),
Benabou (1996a, b).
5 Piketty (1997) claims that it is impossible to create financial markets to finance
education, since (future) work effort is unobservable and contracts contingent on
it are not enforceable.
6 Redistributing incomes among agents is not the only way to increase efficiency.
A scheme of education subsidies financed through taxation of future incomes
(intertemporal redistribution) re-creates the missing market, and allows the attain-
ment of a situation of Pareto optimality. See Banerjee and Newman (1993).
7 Benabou (1996c) states that one standard deviation reduction in inequality
increase GNP per capita of about 0.5–0.7 per cent. Perotti (1996) found that a
GNP 1 per cent increase in middle incomes (proxied by third and fourth quartiles
in income distribution) yields an increase in GNP per capita growth rate of the
order of 0.2 per cent. Persson and Tabellini (1994) provide a higher estimate (of
the order of 0.7 per cent).
8 Barro (2000) found a negative correlation for poor countries (i.e. GDP per
capita below US$2070 (1985 dollars)) but a positive one for rich countries. Forbes
(2000) discusses alternative reasons (measurement errors, omitted variable bias)
why negative correlation could represent a distorted outcome; using panel tech-
niques she found a positive correlation of past inequality on current growth rates
within each country.
9 Which is actually positive and significant, as found in Perotti (1996). The same
author, when discussing Benabou (1996c), suggests a reverse causation: fast-
growing economies have more resources available for redistribution. Alesina (1998)
points out that most of the redistributive policies in developing countries benefit
the middle class rather than the poorest.
10 The relationship between inequality and political instability can be read in a
reverse way: harsh social conflict (e.g. during coups) may cause high casualties but,
if successful, introduces regressive policies that increase income inequality (e.g. the
Chilean case).
11 Bourguignon (1994) found an overall negative relationship between inequality
and growth in a sample of 35 small–medium-sized developing countries. His results
are driven mainly by the sub-sample of Asian countries, which experienced early
land redistribution and more compressed income distribution, combined with gov-
ernment efforts to encourage higher education. He also points out that a positive
relationship between inequality and growth could apply to Latin American coun-
tries, via financing of investment (more inequality implies greater profits and there-
fore more financing opportunities for investment). Brandolini and Rossi (1998)
made an effort to strengthen data comparability in a sample of 17 countries, and
did not find a persistent relationship between household income inequality and
growth (even if they speak of social institutions, where the link could be either 
positive or negative depending on the country area).
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12 This proposition is not tested in the present paper, but finds support in the 
literature. Cf. Barro (1991, 1997).
13 Or any possible combination of the two cases. If, for example, expected future
income is a positive function of talent, randomly distributed in each generation,
poor individuals are the less talented children of both rich and poor families. See
Chiu (1998).
14 See Ichino and Winter-Ebmer (1999) regarding the problems arising when
trying to discriminate between the two explanations.
15 For example, by looking at the significance of a1, which derives from the inver-
sion of equation [5], one can infer the potential existence of ability transmission.
A similar strategy is used by Becker and Tomes (1986), where they replace St-1 with
Xt-1, grandparents’ income.
16 See, for example, Cowell (1995, p. 141).
17 Whenever one has to consider the opposite of
an integral with inverted extremes of integration.
18 It is known that the Gini concentration index corresponds to the ratio of the
areas in the Lorenz graph: GX = A/(A + B).
19 There are alternative cases where we have variations in the distribution of s
independently of changes in income dispersion (as measured by the Gini concen-
tration index): an increase in mean income for a given variance yields an increase
in the access to education for any level of income; alternatively, if we modify the
relationship between income and education (due to a change in the shift parame-
ter g0 that reflects educational expenditure, technology, returns to schooling and
stage of development), once again we obtain an increase in educational achieve-
ments for any given level of income.
20 Barro and Lee (1994) is in turn based on Summers and Heston (1991). The
original data by Barro and Lee (1996) have been criticized on methodological
grounds, as they mix different sources and definitions (de la Fuente, Doménech,
2001). The authors have recognized some of these criticisms (Barro, Lee, 2001).
21 Atkinson and Brandolini (2001) criticize the mixing of different secondary
sources on the grounds of the impossibility of making meaningful comparisons
across countries. However, provided we control for country fixed effects, this
problem is attenuated.
22 See, for example, Grilli (1994), Jones (1997) or Li et al. (1998).
23 Deininger and Squire (1996) provide data of different quality, according to the
coverage of the sample, the inclusion/exclusion of non-labour incomes and infor-
mation about the recipients (individuals or families). Using what they define as
‘high-quality’ data reduces the available observations to 277 (which do not include
data referred to 1995). However, the results are not very different when extended
to include the ‘low quality’ data even if, given their greater variability, the estimates
are less efficient. They also stress the different source of information (incomes or
expenditure), but controlling with a dummy on this aspect (either unconstrained
or interacted with the Gini variable) does not lead to statistically significant results
for the control dummy, implying that different information sources do not affect
the intercept of the relationship. Estimates on a restricted sample including only
‘high-quality’ data are available from the author. The original Deininger and
Squire (1996) data set has been expanded using additional observations for 1995
from the World Bank (1998).
24 Information on the private provision of schooling is scattered, and therefore
we cannot take into account information on the supply of private schooling.
log ni x x( ) -( ) < ( ) +g g s m0 1 2 2
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Arnove et al. (1997) report an impressive increase in private institutions providing
education, especially at university level, as a consequence of the decline in public
expenditure in education: in Latin America the share of students enrolled in private
universities rose from 5 per cent in 1970 to approximately 30 per cent in 1990.
25 In addition, remember that our model described by equation [7] predicts that
the distribution of educational attainments in one generation depends, among
others, on the same distribution for the previous generation.
26 The insignificance of the estimated coefficient for the Gini index is robust
against model misspecification (using the Huber–White estimator) and censoring
of the dependent variable (random-effects tobit model estimation). Both estimates
are available on request.
27 Random-effects estimations for censored data do not imply significant differ-
ences (available from the author).
28 Both estimates are available from the author.
29 And social structures, at least for the case of castes in India. In this country
primary education is not compulsory, and child labour is legal. The huge varia-
tion in literacy rates (which is 74 per cent among urban males and 20 per cent
among rural females) is supposedly explained by the following factors:
The central proposition of this study is that India’s low per capita income and
economic situation is less relevant as an explanation than the belief systems of
the state bureaucracy . . . At the core of these beliefs are the Indian view of the
social order, notions concerning the respective roles of upper and lower social
strata, the role of education as a means of maintaining differentiations among
social classes, and concerns that ‘excessive’ and ‘inappropriate’ education for the
poor would disrupt existing social arrangements. (Weiner, 1991, p. 5)
30 Unfortunately, child mortality proxies too many effects that interplay with
primary education. For example, child mortality is negatively correlated with
mothers’ education and with health conditions (sanitation, doctors’ availability,
etc.). For this reason we do not want to put excessive emphasis on an ‘income dis-
tribution’ interpretation. However, using household surveys, Filmer and Pritchett
(1998) show that the first principal component extracted from information on 
ownership of durable goods and quality of housing is a rather good predictor of
educational attainment.
31 See the various issues of the Human Development Report (UNDP, 1997).
32 In the case of Tanzania, for example, where primary attendance was 0.34 in
1970, 0.93 in 1980 and 0.70 in 1990, class dimension can vary between 30 and 74
in rural areas. See Tibaijuka and Cormack (1998).
33 That the number of students per teacher does not represent a good proxy for
school quality has already been pointed out (see, for example, Hanushek, 1986,
1995, 1996).
34 The fertility rate indicates the number of potential children that an ‘average’
woman — i.e. following the average behaviour of the country in terms of marriage
age, frequency of pregnancies, etc. — could give birth to during her period of fer-
tility. We also found a variable describing the ‘number of person per family’ (source:
World Bank — correlation coefficient with fertility rate = 0.73), but it has too few
observations (211 for the whole sample) and therefore we had to discard it.
35 Similar results were obtained by Schultz (1988) on a sample of 155 countries
over the period 1950–80, where he found a positive effect of the relative size of
school-aged population on enrolment rates for primary education.
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36 Introducing the illiteracy rate as an explanatory variable proves statistically
significant, with a negative sign, but the number of observations drops to 195 
(corresponding to 69 countries). Contrariwise, when using the number of daily
newspapers or the number of radio sets per 1,000 inhabitants, one obtains nega-
tive but statistically insignificant coefficients.
37 Working on household surveys collected in 35 countries, Filmer and Pritchett
(1998) have shown that:
Very low primary attainment by the poor is driven by two distinct patterns of
enrolment and drop-out. There is a South-Asian and Western/Central African
pattern in which many of the poor never enrol in school. In these countries more
than 40 per cent of poor children never complete even grade 1 and typically only
one in four complete grade 5. In contrast there is a Latin American pattern in
which enrolment in grade 1 is (nearly) universal but drop-out is the key problem.
(Filmer, Pritchett, 1998, p. 3).
However, their conclusion does not contradict present results: ‘These data cast
some doubts on the notion that physical availability of school facilities at the
primary or secondary level is the key issue in many countries’ (Filmer, Pritchett,
1998, p. 4).
38 He notices that the lack of locally trained manpower attracts expatriates,
who have higher reservation wages and are often remunerated with grant aid,
thus crowding out local competencies even further. Also, Schultz (1988) found a
negative effect of teacher wages on primary and secondary enrolment.
39 Analogous measures obtain for the random-effects model (available from the
author).
40 Estimates not reported in Table 3, but available from the author.
41 It also renders the Gini coefficient insignificant, but it remains significant in
random-effects estimation using robust estimators. The Gini coefficient also
remains significant when analysing yearly cross-section, whereas at regional level
its significance seems more attributable to North African and South-Asian coun-
tries (all estimates available from the author).
42 Given the reduction in the number of countries/years for which informa-
tion is available, we could introduce sample selection biases. However, when we
compare the full sample estimates (column 1 of Table 3) with the reduced sample
(column 1 of Table 4, we notice that the size and significance of the coefficients
are not modified.
43 From column 3 of Table 4, taking the total derivative of secondary enrolment
with respect to government expenditure on education over GDP yields positive
values for the Gini index above 0.37.
44 See Card (1999).
45 The variable ‘average years of primary education’ (the sample mean for the
population over 15 is 3.96 years) is obtained by multiplying the variable ‘share of
the population with completed and uncompleted primary education’ (the sample
mean for the population over 15 is 0.632) with the variable ‘years of duration of
primary education’ (the sample mean for 1965 is 6.31). Therefore, an increase of
1 year in the average years of primary education can be obtained by increasing the
primary attendance in the population by 0.158 (obtained as result of 1/6.31).
46 These two channels cannot be tested directly because of the lack of appro-
priate data. Estimates of returns to schooling for several countries (but limited to
very few years) are reported in Psacharopoulos (1994). Unemployment rates for
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educational attainment do not exist on such a long time span and for so many
countries.
47 A rather plausible assumption: see Benabou (1996b, c).
48 This evidence is confirmed by including another variable, the ‘ratio of total
workers to population’, which Barro and Lee (1994) report as drawn from Summer
and Heston (1991), and extends up to 1985. We have been unable to update this
variable in a consistent way. However, if we re-estimate the model reported in
column 1 of Table 3 over the period 1960–85 including this variable, it turns out
to be significant, with the coefficient equal to 0.491 (1.96). This implies that an
increase in the employment rate of 10 per cent calls for an increase in secondary
enrolment of almost 5 per cent. This seems unrelated to the type of secondary edu-
cation that is available: a variable measuring the share of vocational education in
secondary education is statistically insignificant.
49 A negative coefficient for the Gini coefficient is obtained in the random-effects
estimation and for some cross-sections (especially 1970 and 1980).
50 Here again, the data (using the specification of column 1 in Table 5) do not
reject the restriction coefficient(log Y ) = -coefficient(G): F(1,226) = 0.03 (p = 0.86).
51 One could imagine the possibility that education at later stages could influence
enrolment at earlier stages (think of the case of limited access to university reduc-
ing the enrolment to secondary schools). While being valid in principle, this objec-
tion neglects the fact that it is always possible to create a private supply of the
rationed good.
52 We would also have expected a negative correlation between the share of stu-
dents enrolled in vocational secondary schools and enrolment to university (since
students from generalist secondary schools are inputs to higher education), but
this does not arise in our data.
53 In the case of primary education, for homogeneity with secondary and 
tertiary education, we have re-estimated the model reported in Table 2, replacing
the variable ‘Share of the corresponding population over 15 with some primary
education’ with ‘Average years of education in the population over 15 with some
primary education’. While the former was statistically insignificant, the latter is 
significant.
54 An alternative explanation of the same evidence is put forward by Bourguignon
and Verdier (2000). They present a model where an oligarchic class decides upon
the optimal size of the poor to be educated. Since the franchise is one to one with
education, the latter variable feeds back into taxation and redistribution decided
upon by majority voting. Thus, when inequality is high, majority voting is likely to
produce strong redistribution, and therefore the oligarchy has an incentive to
restrict the access to education. However, their explanation is valid provided dem-
ocratic participation is positively correlated with educational achievements. Since
the former variable is difficult to define, this constitutes the focus of future research.
55 This incorporates the direct effect (first line of Table 6) and the indirect effect
(first line times third line lagged for one level).
56 This policy advice is typically based on the comparison between private and
social returns to education. Since the usual ranking of returns is primary > sec-
ondary > tertiary, there should be grounds to claim an expenditure reallocation in
favour of the primary level. See Birdsall and James (1993) and Psacharopoulos
(1994).
57 For this reason the following conclusion does not seem to be supported: ‘. . .
preliminary evidence suggests that the second pattern — restricted public sector
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capacity and a large private sector — is superior with respect to access, providing
much higher overall enrolment ratios and thus higher rates of participation by
lower-income groups’ (Birdsall, James, 1993, p. 344).
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